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ACCOMPLICE - DEFINITION - EFFECT OF UNCORROBoRATED TEsTi-

MONY -[Illinois]
The defendant
was convicted under an indictment
for receiz'ing stolen goods. The
conviction was based solely upon
the uncorroborated testimony of the
thief, one Morgan. The witnesses
for the defense were both numerous
and well substantiated. Held, on
appeal: judgment reversed on the
ground that the witness Morgan
was an accomplice of the defendant, and though "the testimony of
an accomplice is competent, it is
subject to great suspicion, and
should be acted on with great caution. If such testimony is of such
a character as to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, it will authorize a verdict of guilty. " Conviction
on the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice, however, will not be
sustained unless the record is substantially free from prejudicial
error." The court found such error
in attempts of the prosecution to
introduce wholly irrelevant matter,
with the manifest intent of prejudicing the jury: People v. Gordon
(Ill. 1931) 176 N. E. 722.

Ohrenstein, Edward W.
*Ray, George K.
Wlenke, Harvey W.

Aside from a certain looseness
of phraseology, the statement of law
above quoted is fully in line with
established authority both in this
and in other jurisdictions: People
v. Johnson (1924) 314 Ill. 486, 145

N. E. 703; People v. Lewis (1924)
313 Ill. 312, 145 N. E. 149; People
v. McGeoghegan (1927) 325 Ill.
337, 156 N. E. 378; Faulkner v.
Town of South Boston (1924) 139
Va. 569, 123 S. E. 358; U. S. v.
Mule (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930) 45 Fed.
(2nd) 132. Cf. Cobb v. State
(1924) 20 Ala. App. 3, 100 S. 463;
Sykes v. U. S. (1913) 204 F. 909,
123 C. C. A. 205. Of course, what
the court indubitably means is that
the record of a conviction on an
accomplice's uncorroborated testimony will be reviewed more carefully than in a case where there is
'a substantial amount of corroborative evidence against the accused.
For to frame the rule as the court
does, results in failure to distinguish
this class of case from any other.
More explicitly, it is true of any
criminal case that the record must
be substantially free from prejudicial error, or that the jury must
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be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused.
The rule that the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction obtained at common law and now prevails in a majority of the states and
in the Federal Courts: Comment
(1929) 14 Iowa Law Rev. 480;
People v. Birger (1928) 329 Ill.
352, 160 N. E. 564; People v. Buskievich (1928) 330 Ill. 352, 162 N.
E. 196; Rogers v, U. S. (C. C. A.
10th, 1931) 46 Fed. (2nd) 38;
Tinsley v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8th,
1930) 43 Fed. (2nd) 890; State v.
McIntyre (1931) 132 Kan. 43, 294
Pac. 865; Hermann v. State (Ind.
1930) 170 N. E. 786. It is an inherent part of this rule, however,
as the court says, that such testimony should be subjected to the
closest scrutiny: People v. Cotell
(1921) 298 Ill. 207, 131 N. E. 659;
People v. Andrae (1920) 295 Ill.
445, 129 N. E. 178; People v.
Schallinan (1921) 295 Ill. 560, 129
N. E. 569; People v. Pattin (1919)
290 Ill. 542, 125 N. E. 248. Faulkner v. Town of South Boston, supra :
Rosen v. U. S. (1921) 271 Fed.
651; Myers v. State (1901) 43 Fla.
500, 31 So. 275. In a few states
the general rule has been departed
from by means of statutory provisions requiring corroboration of
the testimony of accomplices before
conviction may be had thereon:
Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9903; Iowa
Code 1924, sec. 13901; Or. Code
1920, sec. 1540; Okla. Comp. Stat.
(1921) sec. 2701; Cal. Pen. Code
1923, sec. 1111. It may be observed
that in addition to this requirement
for corroboration, the California
Code also specifically requires that
the jury be instructed to consider
the testimony of an accomplice with
great caution: Cal Code Civ. Proc.
1923, sec. 2061.

However, in addition to a review
of the rules discussed, the case also
lends itself to further and more
pertinent discussion. It is not clear
why the court chose to consider the
case as one involving the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
The testimony in question was that
of the thief from whom the goods
were allegedly received. It appears
erroneous to consider the thief as
an accomplice of the one who received the stolen goods. The general test by which to determine
whether one is an accomplice of a
defendant on trial is whether or
not he could be indicted and punished for the crime with which the
defendant is charged: People v.
Sapp (1917) 282 Ill. 51, 118 N. E.
416; Liegois v. State (1914) 73
Tex. Cr. 142, 164 S. W. 382; People v. Sweeney (1914) 213 N. Y.
37, 106 N. E. 913. Cf. People v.
Coffey (1911) 161 Cal. 433, 119
Pac. 901. And "it is elementary
law that one who steals property
cannot be convicted of receiving
the property stolen," but is guilty
of a separate and distinct offense:
State v. Scott (Iowa 1907) 113 N.
W. 758; State v. Boyd (Iowa 1922)
191 N. W. 86; State v. Feinberg
(Iowa 1910) 124 N. W. 208; 2
Bishop "Criminal Law" (9th ed.
1923) Par. 1140 cl. 2; Reset v.
State (1924) 27 Ariz. 43, 229 Pac.
936; Adams v. State (1920) 25 Ga.
App. 399, 103 S. E. 722; State v.
Glazebrook (Mo. 1922) 242 S. W.
928; Buttry v. State (1921) 180
Okla. Cr. 330, 194 Pac. 286.
Undoubtedly the case should have
been reversed, either on the ground
of insufficient evidence to support
the verdict or prejudicial error rising out of misconduct of the prosecution. But, at least technically,
there seems to have been no reason for the court to apply the prin-
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ciples relating to convictions had on
the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices.
HARRY SHRIMAN.

CRIMINAL LAW-MERGER OF OFFENSES-SENTENCE AND PUNIsH-

MENT.-[Illinois] In June, 1903,
James Sammons and two others
were indicted for the robbery of
Michael Lamer while armed with a
dangerous weapon with the intent,
if resisted, to kill and maim Lamer.
The verdict found Sammons guilty
of robbery in manner and form as
charged in the indictment, and that
at the time of the robbery he was
armed with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill and maim, if resisted, in
manner and form as charged in the
indictment. On February 13, 1904,
the court overruled motions for new
trial and in arrest of judgment, and
sentenced Sammons to the penitentiary'"for the crime of robbery, etc.,
whereof he stands convicted . . .
until discharged by the State Board
of Pardons as authorized and directed by law, provided such term
of imprisonment shall not exceed
the maximum term for the crime of
which the said defendant was conSammons
victed and sentenced."
and the same two other men had
also been indicted in the same court
for the murder of Patrick Barrett, and on February 25, 1904, a
jury found them guilty as charged,
and fixed the punishment of Sammons at death. There was judgment
on the verdict, the court setting
June 17, 1904, as the day of execution. On June 16 the Governor
commuted his sentence to life imprisonment, and the next day the
commutation, together with the mittimus issued on conviction for robbery were delivered to the warden
at Joliet, and Sammons began his
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Nineteen
term of imprisonment.
years later, on June 20, 1923, a
second commutation by the Governor reduced his murder sentence
to fifty years. One month later the
Division of Pardons and Paroles
gave him a conditional parole, and
on January 28, 1926, ordered his
final discharge "for and on account
of his conviction for murder." The
Governor approved this discharge.
On November 26, 1930, the Division
of Pardons and Paroles entered an
order expunging and declaring void
both the conditional parole and the
final discharge, and directing the
warden to issue a warrant for the
returr of Sammons to the penitentiary. He was returned the next
day. No commutation or order had
ever been made respecting the robbery sentence. A petition alleging
Sammons to have been imprisoned
illegally, and seeking his release on
habeas corpus, was filed in the Supreme Court. The petitioner contended: 1. That the court by its
death sentence abrogated the earlier
sentence for robbery, or that, in any
event, the robbery sentence was abrogated by, or merged in, the sentence for murder. 2. That even if
the robbery sentence had been effective, the maximum punishment
under it could have been only fourteen years imprisonment, and it had
expired before the first parole was
granted. 3. That the first two orders of the Parole Board were
valid, and the third, expunging them,
was void. Held: that the robbery
sentence was neither abrogated by,
nor merged in, the murder sentence,
that the sentence was life imprisonment, and, in the absence of action
by or under the executive authority
releasing Sammons from that sentence, he must continue to serve it.
Therefore he was remanded to the
custody of respondent; People ex
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rel. Sammons v. Hill, Warden
(1931) 345 Ill. 103, 177 N. E. 723.
The court argued that if there had
been an abandonment of the robbery sentence the mittimus would
not have been delivered to the warden, and Sammons would not have
begun to serve his sentence under it.
The court also stated that there
could have been no merger of the
judgments which were absolutely
separate and distinct. Before the
first judgment there could have been
no merger of the offenses of robbery and murder: Duvall v. State
(1924) 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N.
E. 90. The merger of one offense
in another occurs when the same
criminal act constitutes both a
felony and a misdemeanor. In such
a case at common law the misdemeanor is merged in the felony, and
the latter only is punishable: Johnson v. State (1857) 26 N. J. L.
313. But this doctrine applies only
where the same *criminal act constitutes both offenses, and there is
identity of time, place, and circumstances: Johnson v. State (1861)
29 N. J. L. 453; Hughes v. Commonwealth (1909) 1.31 Ky. 502. 115
S. W. 744. The offenses must be
of different grades, and the rule has
no application where both crimes are
misdemeanors, or both are felonies,
though one may be of much graver
character than the other, and punishable with much more severity:
Orr v. People (1896) 63 Ill. App.
305; Bell v. State (1872) 48 Ala.
684; State v. Dineen (1865) 10
Minn. 407. In many jurisdictions
the rule of merger as formerly existing at common law has been confined to very narrow limits: Graff
v. People (1904) 208 Ill. 312, 70
N. E. 299; Bell v. State (1898) 103
Ga. 397, 30 S. E. 294.
The commutations by the Governor both expressly recited the con-
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viction for murder, and neither
mentioned the robbery conviction.
The final discharge by its terms related solely to the murder conviction. The court therefore concluded
that the robbery sentence remained
wholly unaffected by the orders or
proceedings which concerned only
the conviction for murder.
The weight of authority supports
the rule that two or more sentences
of a defendant to the same place
of confinement run concurrently in
the absence of specific provisions in
the judgment to the contrary: Ex
parte Gafford (1899) 25 Nev. 101,
57 Pac. 484. Fartson v. Elbert

(1902) 117 Ga. 149, 43 S. E. 492;
Ex parte Black (1913) 162 N. C.
457, 78 S. E. 273; In re Breton

(1899) 93 Me. 39, 44 At. 125.
The same rule applies where the
sentences are from different courts:
Zerbst v. Lyman (1919) 255 Fed.
609; People v. Graydon (1928) 329
Ill. 398, 160 N. E. 748. Contra;
Hightower v. Hollis (1904) 121 Ga.
159, 48 S. E. 969; State v. Ryder
(Neb. 1930) 230 N. W. 586. Therefore, if the robbery sentence had
been for fourteen years only as the
petitioner contended, it would have
expired before the time of the parole, and so it became necessary to
inquire whether the conviction was
for robbery or for the aggravated
offense. The court stated the rule
that "in determining the insufficiency of a verdict and a judgment
thereon, the entire record will be
searched, and all parts of the record
interpreted together, and a deficiency at one place may be cured
by what appears at another: People
v. Murphy (1900) 188 Ill. 144, 58
N. E. 984; People v.Tierney (1911)
250 Ill. 515, 95 N. E. 447. Under
the statute in force in 1904 it was
necessary for a conviction of the
aggravated offense of robbery that
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the jury find the intent of the accused to kill and maim if resisted:
McKevitt v. People (1904) 208 Ill.
460, 70 N. E. 693; People v. Nowasky (1912) 254 Ill. 146, 98 N.
E. 242. This requirement would
seem to have been satisfied by the
verdict in the case under consideration, and the court approved the
verdict by overruling the motion for
a new trial, and sentencing Sammons to the penitentiary "for the
crime of robbery, etc., whereof he
stands convicted."
As the court
stated it: "The indictment charged
and the jury by their verdict found
that Sammons had committed the
aggravated offense of robbery. The
verdict, by the rendition of judgment upon it, determined not only
the character of the crime, but also
the maximum term 'of imprisonment: People v. Secco (1922) 303
Ill. 546, 135 N. E. 884. The punishment prescribed for the crime of
robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon with intent, if resisted,
to kill and maim the victim, at the
time of Sammons conviction was
imprisonment for any term of years
or for life- 2 Jones and Addingtons
Ill. Stat. Ann. pp. 2150, 2151, par.
3924. Sammons was sentenced to
imprisonment in the penitentiary
for a term "which shall not exceed
the maximum term for the crime
for which the said defendant was
convicted and sentenced." The sentence was governed by the provisions of the Parole Act then in
effect, and the sentence was for the
maximum term of imprisonment
prescribed by law." People v. Connors (1920) 291 Ill. 614, 126 N. E.
595; People v. Peters (1910) 246
Ill. 351, 92 N. E. 889; People v.
Campbell (1910) 246 Ii. 432, 92
N. E. 919.
This case presents several interesting questions which were not

touched upon by the court, and upon
which the authorities seem to be
silent. Did the sentence of death
for murder abrogate the earlier robbery sentence since it was obviously
impossible for Sammons to serve
both? If so, did the commutation
of the death sentence to life imprisonment revive the robbery sentence? Granting that the orders
under the Parole Act were designed
to terminate the imprisonment and
change the status of the prisoner
to that of a free man, restoring him
to his former place in society, how
is it logically possible to say that
a parole and subsequent final discharge were limited to one offense,
the prisoner to remain and serve
the rest of a sentence arising under
another? Did this impossibility, if
it is an impossibility, invalidate the
parole and subsequent discharge,
and is Sammons now imprisoned under two life sentences, or was the
order valid and irrevocable in so
far as it wiped out the offense and
sentence for murder, and inoperative only in restoring Sammons to
freedom?
DAVID S. SAMPSELL.
CRIMINAL

OF JURORS -

LAW -

EXAIMINATION

RACIAL PREUUDICE.--

[United States] The defendant, a
negro, was convicted of the first degree murder of a white policeman
in the District of Columbia. The
trial court refused to examine 'the
jury on its voir dire to determine
whether any juror, because of the
fact that the defendant was a negro
and the deceased a white man,
might be racially prejudiced in such
a manner as would prevent his giving an impartial verdict. Held:
reversed: Aldridge v. U. S. (1931)
51 Sup. Ct. 470 (reversing Aldridge
v. United States (App. D. C. 1931)
47 F. (2nd) 407).
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Amendment VI of the Federal
Constitution provides for a speedy
and public trial by an -impartial
jury. In criminal cases, where the
life of the accused is at stake, counsel for the' defendant is apt to put
so many questions to the prospective
jurors in attempting to obtain an
impartial jury as to delay considerably the progress of the trial. To
what extent the judge should curb
counsel in this questioning is a perplexing problem. Difficulty arises
in determining not only at what
length counsel should question the
jurors, but also what inquiries
should be put to them. The court
has to determine whether or not the
inquiries are pertinent to the case
at hand and it is within its discretion to limit or permit the questioning: Bonfils v. Rayed (1921) 70
Colo. 336, 201 P. 677; Commonwealth v. Spencer (1912) 212 Mass.
438, 99 N. E. 266.
Most jurisdictions have allowed
counsel to inquire from the jurors
on their voir dire whether they
were racially prejudiced to such an
extent as would prevent their giving an impartial verdict: People
v. Reyes and Valencia (1855) 5 Cal.
347; Poter v. Statc (1919) 86 Tex.
Cr. R. 381, 216 S. W. 886; Pinder
v. State (1891) 27 Fla. 370, 8 S.
837; State v. McAfee (1870) 64
N. C. 339; Hill v. State (1916) 112
Miss. 260, 72 S. 1003; Horst v.
Silverman (1898) 20 Wash. 233, 55
P. 52.
Prior to the principal case, the
question of racial prejudice was
considered by an appellate Federal
court, and an entirely different result was obtained.
This court
argued that where the colored race
is accorded the same privileges and
rights that are given to the white
race, and the social situation in the
community is not such as to create
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a feeling of prejudice, the refusal to
permit such an inquiry is not an
abuse of discretion: Crawford v.
United States (1930) 59 App. D. C.
356, 41 F. (2nd) 979. This reasoning was refuted, however, by the
United States Supreme Court in the
instant case, finding that the main
determination is not that of community feeling, but whether the
particular veniremen are biased to
such an extent as to prevent their
rendering an impartial verdict,
which bias or prejudice could not
be ascertained without proper examination.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting, looked to the practical side
of the case, and did not feel that
the facts warranted a reversal, taking the position that the courts
should not "magnify theoretical possibilities" where an individual is
obviously guilty of a crime: 51
Sup. Ct. at pages 473-474. There is
an increasing tendency for courts
to veer away from reversing cases
on mere technicalities where the
error is not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant:
State v. Mulroy (1922) 152 Minn.
423, 189 N. W. 441; State v. Barnett
(1918) 202 Ala. 191, 79 S. 677;
Crafford v. State (1925) 169 Ark.
225, 273 S. W. 13; Dunaway v.
State (1925) 90 Fla. 142, 105 S.
816; People v. O'Brien (1917) 277
II. 305, 115 N. E. 123; Meno v.
State (1925) 197 Ind. 16, 148 N. E.
420; People v. Kasem (1925) 230
Mich. 278, 203 N. W. 135; State
v. Webb (1917) 36 N. D. 235, 162
N. W. 362. Especially is this true
where the accused is plainly guilty:
Simnwns v. United States (C. C.
A. 6th 1924) 300 F. 321. In the
principal case, the dissent pointed
out that there is no actual showing
that the refusal to allow tlie inquiry would work to defendant's
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detriment, that is, that any juror
was prejudiced.
It seems that racial prejudice is
not dependent upon location or social situation. Such prejudice may
exist practically everywhere, each
race, perhaps, thinking his own superior to the other. Mere race
prejudice, however, should not disqualify an individual from becoming a juror: Bass v. State (1910)
59 Tex. Cr. R. 186, 127 S. W. 1020
State v. Casey (1892) 44 La. Ann.
969, 11 S. 583; State v. Green
(1910) 229 Mo. 642, 129 S. W.
700; Commonwealth v. DePalma
(1920) 268 Pa. 25, 110 A. 756. The
further inquiry should be made as
to whether the prejudiced state of
mind would prevent him from rendering an impartial verdict. If the
prospective juror states that he can
give the accused a: fair trial, i'n
spite of his racial prejudice such
bias should not work to his disqualification. But whatever the degree of prejudice necessary to disqualify a juror, surely it is a better procedure to ask the juror
whether he is so biased to such an
extent as to cause him to render
an impartial verdict, and upon a
negative answer allow him to remain as a juror, than to permit a
possibly prejudiced juror to try
the accused without such inquiry.
EDWARD S. ALTERSOHN.

CRIMINAL LAw-HoMICIDE-ExH uATIox O1 BODY oF DECEASED
ON MOTION OF DEFENDANT.-[Ken-

The defendant, with others, had held up and robbed a bank
and was making his escape from
the immediate vicinity in an automobile. The deceased, a private
citizen living in an adjoining town,
received a telephone message that
the robbers were coming that way
tucky]
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and to intercept them. Thereupon,
he and a companion, one Kirby, also
a private citizen, took the former's
automobile and set out. After going a short distance, the deceased
met the robbers, who turned their
car down a side road and fled, with
the deceased in close pursuit. While
proceeding thus, the road was found
to be blocked by a posse; both cars
were brought to a sudden stop, and
pursuers and pursued got out of
their respective cars at practically
Simultaneously,
the same time.
shots from revolvers and rifles were
fired from both 'sides, and the deceased was killed by a shot in the
back as he was alighting from his
car. Defendant was shooting a revolver; Kirby, deceased's com'panion, was armed with a rifle,
which was discharged as he was
alighting from his side of the car,
the bullet passing through the car
door.
The State's theory of the case was
that the defendant had fired the
shot which killed the deceased; th
defendant's theory was that the deceased had been shot by the accidental firing of his companion's
rifle.
A motion was filed by
attorney, supthe defendant's
ported by- an unsworn affidavit
signed only by the attorney, to exhume the body of the deceased, at
the defendant's expense, for the
purpose of determining the type of
bullet which caused the death, and
also the direction and angle of fire.
This motion was denied and an- exception taken. The refusal of the
motion was made the focal point of
the case on appeal. Held: that the
overruling of the motion was error
and that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted:
Sexson v. Commonwealth (1931)
239 Ky. 177, 39 S. W. (2) 229.
There was a dissenting opinion by
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two Justices on the grounds that
there was no showing that the exhumation was necessary in the interests of justice in order to disclose new and pertinent evidence;
that the motion to exhume was defective in that it was not sworn to
or signed by the defendant; that
there was no averment that the defendant would defray the expense
of an expert in ballistics should a
bullet be found; and that the evidence clearly showed the guilt of
the defendant so that his interests
had not been prejudiced by the refusal of the motion: Sexson v.
Commonwealth (1931) 239 Ky. at
179.
The question of the privilege of
a defendant in a criminal trial to
require the exhumation of the body
of the deceased for the purpose of
securing evidence in aid of his defense appears to have come before
courts of last resort in comparatively few cases. In the leading
case on the subject, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas laid
down the general principle, now
well established in most jurisdictions, that the granting to a defendant of permission to exhume
the body lies within the discretion
of the trial court, and that exhumation should be allowed only where
there is a strong showing that new
and vital facts will be disclosed
thereby, and where truth and justice require it for the purpose of
protecting life and property: Gray
v. State (1908) 55 Tex. Cr. App.
90, 114 S. W. 635. In its opinion,
the Court drew attention to the fact
that the State has the right to exhume a body to obtain evidence to
make out its case, and that a defendant should have the same advantage in making his defense. In
that case the defendant was charged
with a murder by shooting. There
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had been no eyewitnesses to the
crime, and the body had been buried
after a cursory examination by
casual observers.
Furthermore,
there was a sharp conflict in the
evidence as to the position and appearance of the bullet-holes, with
reference to the direction and angle
of fire of the fatal shot, and also
as to the question whether tbe deceased had been shot from the front
or the rear. In this state of the
evidence, the Court held that an exhumation was necessary and that it
was error to refuse it.
The above-mentioned principle
was followed in a similar case in
which there was a conflict in the
testimony as to whether the deceased had been killed by a bullet
fired from a rifle from in front, or
from a revolver fired from the
rear. In this case, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine held that it
was error to refuse a motion to
exhume, regardless of the fact that
an examinatiori of the body had
been made by the State Medical
Examiner, where such examination
was lacking in vital facts as to the
character of the fatal bullet and
the direction of fire: State v.
Wood (1928) 127 Me. 197, 142 Atl.
728. See also a dictum to the effect
that it is within the discretion of
the trial court to grant a motion to
exhume, and where there is a reasonable belief that pertinent facts
will be disclosed thereby, it is the
duty of the court to so order: Gilberry v. State (1929) 113 Tex. Cr.
App. 9, 18 S. W. (2) 615. The
principle that it is within the discretion of the trial court to grant a
motion for exhumation has been
recognized in the following cases:
Commonwealth v. Marshall (1927)
287 Pa. 512, 135 Atl. 301; Johnson
v. State (1927) 106 Tex. Cr. App.
482, 293 S. W. 173; Moss v. State
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(1907) 152 Ala. 30, 44 So. 598;
People v. Campbell (1918) 282 Ill.
614, 118 N. E. 1032; Shields v.
State (1921) 89 Tex. Cr. App. 421,
231 S. W. 779.
On the other hand, where is appears that no new or pertinent evidence will be disclosed by an exhumation, a refusal of a motion to
exhume has been held proper:
Shields v. State, supra (a case in
which the witnesses were in accord
as to the position of the entrance
and exit holes of the bullet, where
there was no contention that the deceased had been shot in the back,
and where an autopsy, from the
nature of the situation, would have
failed to reveal whether the deceased was shot while standing up
or lying down); Johnson v. State,
supra (refusal
of
exhumation
proper where no new evidence
would be disclosed by an autopsy);
Moss v. State, supra (refusal of
exhumation proper where a prior
autopsy had disclosed the relevant
facts and a second one could reveal
no new evidence); People v. Campbell, supra (refusal of exhumation
proper where the manner of death
was sufficiently established by evidence already submitted, and the
only question was .as to the identity of the murderer); Commonwealth v. Marshall, supra (refusal
of exhumation proper where the
motion to exhume did not show
what was proposed to be disclosed,
in addition to evidence already submitted). It has been further held
that a motion to exhume was properly refused because of failure on
the part of the defendant to notify
the relatives of the deceased of the
proposed exhumation:
Commonwealth v. Marshall, supra.
Where exhumation is allowed, the
expenses incidental thereto are to
be borne by the defendant; the State

may refuse to appoint commissioners to exhume and examine a body
at the State's expense, without
prejudicing the right of the defendant to exhume at his own expense:
Johnson v. State,supra., Even where
a defendant-is unable to defray the
expense of exhumation, he cannot
demand that it be done at the expense of the State: Salisbury v.
Commonwealth (1881) 79 Ky. 425.
Where it is resorted to in aid of
the prosecution, it has been held
that such autopsy at the instance
of the District Attorney is proper
and need not be under the direction
of the coroner: Commonwealth v.
Grether (1902) 214 Pa. 203, 53
At. 753.
Once exhumation has
been had, the evidence disclosed
thereby has been held to be admissible: Bilberry v. State, supra;
Laney v. United States (1923) 54
App. D. C. 56, 294 Fed. 412 (even
without notice to the defendant
where the exhumation has been
made by the State).
In the instant case, the Court was
in accord with the general principle
in considering the question of exhumation. It would appear that the
evidence was clearly such as to warrant the granting of a motion to
exhume, that new and vital facts
would be disclosed and the course
of justice furthered thereby. It
was material to the defendant's case
to show whether the deceased was
killed by a bullet from a revolver
or from a rifle, and whether suchbullet entered the body of the deceased from a direction and at an
angle from which he could have
shot. In view of the present development of the modern science of
ballistics, it seems unquestionable
that these facts could have been disclosed upon examination, and therefore the ascertainment of them was
vital to the defense. See Comment
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(1931) 21 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL
LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 607; Serhant, "Admission of Ballistics in
Evidence," 2 American Journal of
Police Science 202.
STUART C.

ABBEY.

CRIMINAL LAw-PuNISHMENT OF
MISDEAS
TEACHER
BY

CHILD

A school
MEANOR.-[California]
boy seven years old was punished
by the defendant to whom it was
reported that the boy had been
fighting after school. A wooden
paddle was used. Under the California Statute any person who wilfully inflicts on any child "pain or
mental suffering is guilty of a misdemeanor": Penal Code of Calif.
(1923) Pt. 1, Tit. 9, Ch. 2, Sec.
283a. The magistrate found that
punishment of the child by the defendant without having confirmed
the hearsay report was unjustifiable
within the meaning of this statute.
Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied.
Held: on appeal, that the judgment
and order should be affirmed; that
under the Statute, it is for the jury
to determine, under the circumstances of each case, whether or
not the infliction of pain or mental
suffering is unwarrantable both as
to the necessity for as well as the
reasonableness of the punishment.
Neither malice nor specific intent is
an element of the offense: People
v. Curtiss (1931 Calif.) 300 P. 801.
Reasonable punishment of a child
seems to be based upon a belief that
under certain circumstances punishment is a proper means of discipline and is ultimately beneficial:
See State v. Pendergrass (1837) 19
N. C. (2 Dcv. & Bat. Law) 365,
366, 31 Am. Dec. 416, 417; State
v. Koonse (1907) 123 Mo. App.
655, 101 S.W. 139, 141. A teacher

stands in loco parentis in respect to
offenses committed within his jurisdiction and responsibility as a
teacher: Lander v. Seaver (1859)
32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (pupil
called teacher "Old Jack Seaver"
before other pupils) ; Danenhoffer
v. State (1879) 69 Ind. 295, 35 Am.
Rep. 216 (pupil did not deliver a
note); O'Rourke v. Walker (1925)
101 Conn. 130, 128 A. 25 (boys
tormenting girls on the way home
from school) ; Stephens v. State
(1906) 44 Tex. Cr. 67, 68 S. W.
281 (pupil writing obscene note in
school). See also Comments (1925)
24 Mich. L. Rev. 80; 4 Va. L. Reg.
11 Cornell
(N. s.) 415-18; (1926)
L. Q. 266; 12 Ann. Cases 353; 76
Am. Dec. 164. For such offenses the
common law rule seems to be that
the teacher may administer reasonable or moderate corporal punishment: State v. Thornton (1904)
136 N. C. 610, 48 S. E. 602; Heritage v. Dodge (1887) 64 N. H. 297,
9 A. 722; Stephens v. State, supra;
on the other hand, it has been held
that immoderate, unreasonable, or
malicious punishment of a child by
a teacher is assault and battery: see
Hathaway v. Rice (1846) 19 Vt.
102, 109; Cf. State v. Bitnman (1862)
13 Ia. 485, 486 (parent and child
relation). Some states have enacted
protective legislation making "unreasonable," "unjust," or "cruel"
treatment of a child a crime: Ill.
Rev, Stat. (Cahill, 1931) ch. 38,
sec. 91 (a misdemeanor); Comp.
Laws of Mich (1929) ch. 247, sec.
12820 (a felony); Penal Code of
Ohio (1930) Title I, ch. 3, sec.
12428 (a misdemeanor) Pa. Stat.
(1920 West Pub. Co.) sec. 13228
(a misdemeanor); Penal Code of
Calif. (1923) Pt. 1, Tit. 9, ch. 2,
sec. 273a.
The common law doctrine of
"reasonable punishment" refers both
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to inflicting any punishment in the
first instance and inflicting such
severe punishment in a situation in
which some punishment is warranted. Some cases hold that the
question of the necessity of any
punishment is solely for the teacher
to decide and is not open to examination by the court: Stephens v.
State, mpra (under Texas Penal
Code art. 593); State v. Jones
(1886) 95 N. C. 588, 59 Am. Rep.
282; Patterson v. Nutter (1886) 76
Me. 509, 7 A. 273, 57 Am. Rep. 818.
Other cases hold, in the absence of
statute, that whether any punishment is warranted is a question for
the jury: Clasen v. Prdhs (1903)
69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640.
Also, as to the amount of punishment there are two distinct lines
of authority. Some cases hold that
all punishment is reasonable which
does not result in disfigurement of
or permanent injury to the child,
or which was not prompted by legal
malice: Dean v. State (1890) 89
Ala. 46, 8 S. 38; followed in Roberson v. State (1928) 22 Ala. App.
413, 116 S. 317; State v. Thornton
(1904) 136 N. C. 610, 48 S. E.
602; State v. Pendergrass, supra.
Other cases interpret "reasonable
punishment" as a standard.to be
used by the jury in determining the
excessiveness of the punishment.
Under the latter theory, permanent
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injury or malice is not made an element of unreasonable punishment:
Ely v. State (1913) 68 Tex. Cr.
562, 152 S. W. 631; Patterson v.
Nutter, supra; Lander v. Seavcr,
supra; People v. Green (1909) 155
Mich. 524, 119 N. W. 1087, 21 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 216 (parental relationship) ; Hinkle v. State (Ind. 1891)
26 N. E. 778 (parental relationship.) But see, Greer v. State (Tex.
1907) 106 S. W. 359. It is uniformly held that punishment provoked by a malicious intent is a
crime. Malice may be of two kinds,
malice in fact and malice in law.
Malice in law is imputed from the
excessiveness of the punishment:
Boyd v. State (1889) 88 Ala. 169,
7 S. 268, 16 Am. St. Rep. 31 (defendant used a stick and also struck
pupil in the face with his fist);
State v. Koonse, supra (defendant
used a buggy whip).
The teacher is favored by two
presumptions: the first, which is
present in every criminal case, that
the defendant is presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt:
Greer v. State,
supra; second, where no improper
weapon is used, chastisement was
proper: Anderson v. State (1859)
3 Head 454, 75 Am. Dec. 774; Van
Vactor v. State (1887)- 113 Ind.
276, 3 Am. St. 645.
ESTHER NEWTON.

